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Summary findings
Some economists have urged reliance on fuel taxes and  sectors but across producers of different sizes. Although
other fiscal incentives to reduce air pollution in semi-  Eskeland and Jimenez (1990) may be correct in arguing
industrialized countries. They argue that policies that act  that fiscal incentives are easier to implement than are
on relative prices are easier to enforce than those based  direct emission controls, the costs of adjustment ar,
on emission monitoring, create less misallocation of  likely to be concentrated fairly narrowly for some fuels.
resources, and are relatively free of the rent-seeking and  The authors found bakeries, for example, to be very
corruption that accompany regulations administered at  responsive to ch.  :ges in the relative prices of alternative
the plant level.  fuels. By contrast, energy demand in metal products
To be effective, however, fuel-specific taxes and  plants appears to be very insensitive to relative prices, no
subsidies must inspire manufacturers to significantly  matter what estimates are used. Meatpackers fall
adjust their input use as relative prices charnge.  somewhere between the two - with little price
Moreover, these policies must not create politically  responsiveness in electricity demand, but more in the
unacceptable income redistribution.  demand for energy from other sources, especially if
Guo and Tybout shed light on both issues by analyzing  coherency-constrained figures are used.
detailed panel data on Chilean manufacturing plants.  It seems that the effects of fuel taxes  vould depend in
Overall, their estimates suggest that there is substantial  significant measure on the sectoral composition of
scone for fuel taxes to encourage fuel substitution, but  manufacturing, since input composition varies and some
that the response will be very uneven - not only across  sectors have little flexibility.
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In the major cities cf many semi-industrialized  countries, air pollution has become a serious
problem. The most cursory tour of Mexico  City, Santiago,  or Jakarta is sufficient  to convince  one that
the externalities  are massive.  Now, after decades of neglect, many policy-makers  are turning their
attention  to the issue and debating  the relative merits of alternative  corrective  measures.
Some economists  have urged reliance  on carbon  taxes and other fiscal incen;ives  (Eskeland  and
Jimenez, 1990). Policies  that act on relative  prices are easier to enfarce than direct controls, creatc less
misallocation  of resources, and are relatively free of the rent-seeking  and corruption that accompany
regulations  administered  at the plant level.  To be effective,  however, fuel-specific  taxes and subsidies
must inspire  manufacturers  to significantly  adjust their production  techniques  as relative prices change.
Moreover, these policies must not create  politically  unacceptable  income redistribution. The purpose of
this paper is to generate new evidence on both issues by analyzing detailed panel data on Chilean
manufacturing  plants.
There is already a large body of evidence  or. fuel elasticities  of derrand. However, the relevance
of this literature is limited by several factors. First, most studies are baced on sectoral time series from
OECD economies,  so the product mix and technologies  they describe differ to an unknown  extent from
those in the semi-industrialized  countries.  Second,  to have  a reasonable  number  of sectoral observations,
many years of data are necessary.  I  But technology  is unlikely to remain fixed over the twenty to thirty
year time spans that are typically  studied. Third, the econometric  literature almost always begins from
the assumption  that production  technologies  are homothetic  in factor inputs.  This is especially  unlikely
to be true in developing  countries,  where the population  of manufacturers  ranges from cottage industry
to large multinationals. Finally, this literature also presumes complete  flexibility to adjust all factor
stocks every year.  But adjustments  in fuel use patterns often require lumpy investments  in retrofitting
I Not all analyses  at the sectoral level are pure time series. Some use relatively  short time periods
but pool across regions or countries,  e.g., Fuss (1977).or new capital equipment,  so observed fuel use patterns reflect adjustment  costs and and expectations
about the future.
We can do better on all counts  by using  plant-level  panel  data from Chile. First, we can explicity
account for non-homotheticities  by allowing  technolog.es  to vary across  plants  of different sizes. Second,
because  transportation  costs and infrastructure  induce  substantial  spatial  variation in prices, we need not
use the time dimension  of our data to identify  paramneters.  This means we can describe the technology
at a recent point in time, rather than some ill-defined  temporal  average for the past thirty years.  Finally,
by taking plant-specific  temporal averages  of all variables  before fitting our model, we come closer to
a representation  of long run behavior than estimators  based on a simple cross section or annual time
series.2
We estimate substitution  elasticities  using plant-level panel data that describe expenditure and
physical consumption  levels for each of 12 alternative  energy sources, inter alia.  The data describe
virtWally  all Chilean  manufacturing  plants with at least ten workers for the period 1979-1986.3  We find,
first, that the degree of substitutability  between fuels is sutstantial in some sectors, but very limited in
others. Second, the variation  in elasticities  across the plant size  spectrum  is at least as large as it is across
industries. For both raasons, the incidence  of carbon taxes is likely to be concentrated  in certain types
of plants.
Several troubiesome econometric  issues complicate  the analysis.  First, although an industry
consumes  many fuels in the aggregate,  each individual  plant is unlikely  to consume  no more than several.
2 In principle,  of course, we could  do better by specifying  an explicitly  dynamic  model (e.g., Rust,
1987). Hovwever,  the returns to this strategy  are limited  by the fact that we don't observe details of the
capital  stock.  Moreover, dynamic  panel data models  suffer from the "init.al  conditions"  and "incidental
parameters" problems, which would necessitate  going to considerably more complicated  estimation
techniques  (Heckman, 1981).
3 These data were originally obtained from the Chilean government  by the World Bank for the
research project "Industrial  Competition,  Productive  Efficiency,  and their Relation  to Trade Regimes,"
RPO 674-46.
3This suggests  that at the typical  plant, some fuels cost more than their marginal  revenue  products at zei  J
consumption,  and accordingly, the first-order conditions  that are used to estimate fuel demads with
sectoral data cannot be justified.  We adopt  the technique  developed  by Lee and Pitt (1987)  to deal with
this problem.
Ano.aer problem  is that to estimate  fuel demands  we must observe  a plant-specific  price for every
fuel, whether it is actually  used or not  Given that we observe physical  quantities  and expenditures  for
each fuel that is used, we surmount  this problem  by estimating  fuel  price equations  that relate unit values
of the fuels to exogenous plant characteristics  such as geographic region, industry and size.  These
equations  are fitted fuel by fuel, using the subset  of plants  for which unit fuel prices could be calculated.
Then fitted values  from these equations  are constructed  for all plants  and treated  as the market prices  that
producers face.  We view this technique  as not only solving the problem of unobservable  prices, but
removing  noise from plant-specific  unit values.
II. The Empirical Model
The Likelihood  Function: Our representation  of producer behavior  is a slight generalization  of
Lee and Pitt's (1987).  Suppose  that output is a function  of capital (K), labor (L), materials  (M), and a
vector of energy inputs (X), some of which may not be used.  Then the profit maximizing  choice of
energy inputs can characterized  be using the Lagrangian:
L  = PKK + PLL + PmM + P,,X  + X(Y -F(KL,M,XJ)  - X
where 0 is a vector of Kuhn-Tucker  multipliers  that impose  non-negativity  constraints  on the elements
of X.  The relevant  first-order  conditions  are:
4aF 
dX  = Px, - Xi '  (2; ax 1 - (1)
oj 2G
So if producers were confronted  with virtual prices, t,  instead  of actual prices, they would behave as if
they were at an interior solution. Accordingly,  standard  first-order  conditions  can be used to identify  the
production  technology  once this substitution  has beer, made.
Proceeding  to do so, suppose  that  the production  function is weakly  separable  in energy  inputs:
Y = F[K,L,M,e(X)J
This ensures that for a given input  of the energy  aggregate,  E, and a given vector of factor input prices,
the choice of energy inputs satisfies  the cost minimization  problem:
min  eX  subject  to  E  = e(X)
x
The mix of energy inputs that solves  this problem  yields  some levei of costs, Ce,  which we approximate
with a standard  translog function:
InC  =  aJ  +  ,  ailnti  +  ylnE + ;  j  Oij Intilnj+  1+  I  Ei  InElnti  +  eInti  (2)
Here the disturbance vector e  =  (e 1,e2,e 3)  picks up plant-specific  variation in technology.  Then the
associated  share equations implied  by Sheppard's lemma  are:
Si'  = a;i + 0,5 E  + Ej  Oij  In tj  + ei,  i  = 1, 2, 3  (3)
Combined  with the bounds  on virtual prices implied  by (1),
(i  = Px,  if Si.  >  o
t  C< PX  if s,  = 0
5and with the assumption  that e  is distributed N(O,E),  these share equations  form the basis for Lee and
Pitt's (1987) likelihood  function. Details  are provided ifi the appendix.
Parameter  constrain.:: The cost function  (2) must be homogtneous  of degree 1 in prices, which
implies the following  standard  parameter constraints:
Ejcx,  +  Ee  =  1,
i=  0l =  0 for all i and j,
(4)
Ei  OEi =°
j=  j3,  i  ￿  j.
To nornalize  disturbances,  we restate the first restriction as:  E, cii =  1 and E, ei =  0.
Depending  upon which combination  of inpuits  is consumed, there are seven possible demand
regimes for any plant.  Each of these may be classified  as one of three basic types: all three inputs are
used, only two inputs are used, and only one kind of input is used.  The likelihood  fimction  will be well
defined only if the seven regime probabilities  sum to one for each possible realization  on exogenous
variables. Lee and Pitt term this condition "coheiency,"  and show that it amounts to concavity  of the
log cost function (2) in log prices.  Coherency will hold automatically  if the underlying production
technology is strictly concave in factor inputs.  Unfortunately,  concavity does not hold globally for
translog  functions. Thus, to ensure a well-defined  likelihood  function  we impose  and test the coherency
constraints  that ,B, <  0,  22  <0,  0  33 <  0,  01122  - (212  >  0,  011033  - 03 >  0,  and t22v33  - 223 >  0.  We
caution  that even this is insufficient  to gaurantee  that our estimated  cost function  is concave in prices at
all data points in the sample. 4
I In estimating the parameters  of their energy cost function, Lee and Pitt (1987) only impose the
restrictions  that all the own-price  parameters  0j are non-positive.
6Homotheticicry: Notice that we have departed from Lee and Pitt (1987), and most others, by
letting e(X) be non-homothetic.  (That is,  Ei  *  0 may occur for particular i values.) As mentioned  in
the introduction,  we do so because  we believe  technologies  in semi-industrialized  countries  are very size-
specific.  Others have presumably imposed  homotheticity  to simplify estimation,  given that E is both
unobserved  and endogenous. In princi,  le, the simultaneity  problem can be dealt with by instrumenting
E with its exogenous  determinants: Q, Px. and non-energy  factor prices.  But since E is not actually
observed, we simply include the instrumental  variables directly in our cost function, sans non-energy
factor prices (which were not available). Since P.  already appears  directly as a cost determinant,  this
amounts to replacing  E with Q in equation (3).
One disavantage  of our approach  is that it does not permit one to isolate  the role of energy  prices
in changing  E from the direct effect of factor priWes  on shares. But this problem may well be negliglible
since the vast majority of the variation in E is due to Q, and in any case, a more severe  bias is present
when homotheticity  is  vrongly  imposed. At a minimum,  our model constitutes  a generalization  of the
standard specification,  and affords a framework  for testing the homotheticity  restriction. 5
III.  Estimation
A.  Price Data
As mentioned  in the introduction,  we use predicted  values  of fuel prices for all plants. There are
two reasons for doing so.  First, most plants report zero consumption  for some fuels.  For these plants
and fuels, the unit price is not available. Second, even though unit fuel prices are available for plants
with non-zero  consumption,  these  are likely to partly reflect  cross-plant  differnces  in fuel  quality.  Hence
I  An alternative  way to motivate our specification  is to simply begin from a cost function that
takes the form:  C = C(PK,  PLP,,P,  C(PX,  Q), Q)  where r is the rental rate on capital, w is the wage
rate, m is the price of materials, and P, is the price of the energy aggregate.
7if we were to  use unit values instead of predicted unit values, we would proba'oly  be introducing
measurement  error bias in our estimator, biasing elasticities  toward zero. (Given that we treat the
predicted  prices as the "true" ones, we make no correction  to the standard  errors in our estimated  share
equations.)
The regression model  used to impute  price for energy  j is given by
lnPij. = 8j + y'jZj, +  niit,
where i indexes  planit,  t indexes  year, and Z is the vector of exogenous  variables. It includes  dumnies
for year, 3-digit or 4-digit industry, region, and business  type, and the logrithm of number  of workers.
For each energy source j,  Oj  and yj are estimated  for plants with positive consumption. The estimated
regression equation for each energy source is then used to impute its predicted price for all plants.
Further analysis  of the sources  of price variation  in our data can be found in Moss and Tybout (1992).
B.  Choice of Sector  and Futl Grouping
The panel data at our disposal describe virtually  all Chilean manufacturing  establishments  with
at least ten workers over the period 1979-86. For each plant and year, they includes expenditure  and
volume data on 12 energy sources:  electricity, coal, carbon, coke, fuel oil, diesel, benzine, parafin,
liquid gas, canned gas, fuel wood, and other fuels.  There are 29 3-digit industries  in total, but we iimit
our attention  to two 4-digit and three 3-digit industries  which are large and/or energy intensive: meat
processing (SIC 3111), bakeries  (SIC 3117), textile (SIC 321), chemical  products (SiC 351), and metal
products (SIC 381).  Descriptive  statistics  for these sectors are presented  in Table 1.
Because all sectors use a substantial  amount of electricity, this is always defined as the first
energy source.  We define the second and third energy sources as aggregations  over subgroups of the
8eleven fuel types, using different aggregations for different sectors.  In forming these groups we
considered two facLors:  shares in total energy expenditure,  and similarity of the fuels.  The second
subgroup is firewood for meatpackcrs  and bakeries; it is coal, carbon and coke for textiles; it is fuel cil
and diesel for chemical  products and metal prod.;cts. The third subgroup  is, of course, everything  else.
9Table 1: Basic Characteristics
Meatpacking  |  Bakeries  Textiles  Chemicals  Metal Prodlets
Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D.
Electricity Share  0.497  0.236  0.419  0.215  0.790  0.251  0.562  0.346  0.667  0.284
2nd Input Share  0.107  0.177  0.326  0.244  0.010  0.069  0.220  0.290  0.077  0.175
3rd Input Share  0.396  0.253  0.256  0.270  0.200  0.245  0.218  0.281  0-256  0.248
Electricity Price (In)  1.460  0.138  1.622  0.105  1.485  0.130  1.404  0.151  1.537  0.130
2nd Input Price (In)  0.748  0.190  0.690  0.136  1.576  0.104  2.564  0.107  2.665  0.099
3rd Input Price (In)  2.487  0.073  2.469  0.064  2.445  0.087  2.228  C.081  2.!59  0.084
Output Value (In)  10.422  1.647  9.284  0.790  9.746  1.271  11.215  1.496  9.658  1.299
Sample Size  173  1176  631  100  671
Cases of Positve
Consumption:
Electricity  171  1176  631  98  671
2nd Input  88  936  31  58  197
3rd Input  152  992  392  71  491
The second and third inputs are aggregated from several actual fuels (11 types in total) used by firms.  The groupings of the second input are
firewood for meatpacking and bakeries; coal, carbon, and coke for textiles; fuel oil and diesel for chemicals and metal products.Once the two non-electric  energy sources had been constructed  we constructed  price indicies for
each as weighted  averages  of the prices of the individual  components:
A
pa  =  wjpi,
Here G is the set of fuels being aggregated,  w  is the weight  of expenditure  of fuel j in that group, and
Pj  is its imputed  price in logarithms. The groupings  of fuels for each sector are shown in Table 1.
IV.  Results
A.  Tests of the Coherency  Constraint
Before  discussing  parameter estimates  it is necessary  to test whether  the coherency constraints
required by the Lee and Pitt framework  are consistent  with our data.  In sectors where they are not, it
is difficult  to proceed.  On the one hand, if the constraints  are not imposed  the likelihood  function  is ill-
defined. On the other hand, if they are imposed,  we have found that it usually  means  that ,,  or  322 are
pushed  to zero, implying  in turn that O12  is zero, so it becomes  impossible  to solve for virtual prices using
equations  A2 or A5 (see the Appendix). Under these circumstances  the only sensible  conclusion  is that
the Lee and Pitt framework  does not provide a reasonable  representation  of the process that generated
the data.  This may be due to unmodelled  dynamics,  to heterogenous  technologies,  or to inappropriate
aggregation  across the individual  fuels when we form our three categories.
Table 2 reports values of the likelihood  function, with and without the coherency constraint
imposed,  for the non-homothetic  version  of our model. Notice  that the constraint is accepted  in the cases
of bakeries, metal products, and (at a  values less than .05) meatpacking. On the other hand, it is
strongly rejected  for chemicals,  and we were unable to obtain constrained  results for the textile industry.
I1Accoringly, in what follows  we will focus  on the former three sectors.
Table 2:  Tests of The Coherency  Restrictions*
Industry  No. of  Unconstrained  Constrained  Likelihood
Observations  Log Likelihood  Likelihood  Ratio Statistic
Function  Function
Meatpacking  173  -88.86  -93.85  9.98
Bakeries  1176  -463.06  -463.06  0.00
Textiles  631  -370.18  no convergence  n.a.
Chemicals  100  -61.75  -98.72  73.94
Metal Products  671  -567.52  -568.94  2.84
C  ritical values  for the X 2(4) distributionare  7.78 at a=  .01, 9.49 at a= .05, 11.14 at c = .025 and
13.28 at a=.01.
B.  Homotheticity
We next  turn to parameter  estimates  sector  by sector. These  are presented  in table 3.  Given that
coherency is a necessary condition for the likelihood  function to be well-defined,  there is no clear
interpretation  for tests based on sectors where coherency  fails.  However, following Lee and Pitt, we
report them nonetheless  for completeness.
The first issue we wish to address is whether  energy  demands  are homothetic  of degree  one with
respect to output.  This hypothesis  amount to the claim that iQ,  =  OQ2 =  OQ3 =  0.  Clearly for the
sectors where inference  is possible, it can be rejected. 6 In fact, almost  every OQ,  value for which standard
errors are obtained is highly significant. (Caution  must be exercized  when interpreting  standard errors
for chemicals, since this sector fails the coherency  test.)
6  For bakeries, the likelihood  ratio statistic  that tests 0 3Q,  =  OQ2 =  OQ3 =  0 is 98.57.  The critical
X 2(2) value is 9.21 when testing at the ox=.01 level.
12Table 3A:  Unconstrained Parameter Estimates by Sector
Parameter  Meatpacking  Bakeries  Textilesb  Chemicals  Metal
Productsb
aI  .651 (.165)  .267 (.090)  3.40  1.05 (.346)  .515
a2 .039 (.148)  .291 (.122)  -1.27  -.739 (.232)  -1.26
a 3 .310 (.240)  .442 (.165)  -1.13  .692 (.208)  1.74
OQJ  .001  (.015)  -.056 (.010)  -.177  -.071 (.035)  .015
13Q2  -.029 (.013)  -.058 (.013)  .062  .101 (.023)  .106
OQ3  .027 (.022)  .114 (.017)  .115  -.030 (.019)  -. 121
Oil  .428 (.163)  -. 329 (.069)  .666  -.288  (.403)  .182
012  -.108 (.045)  -.214 (.035)  -.570  .158 (.221)  -.003
013  -.320 (.124)  .542 (.073)  -.096  1.j  (.182)  -.179
022  -.088 (.049)  -.207 (.044)  .464  -.046 (.065)  -.005
O3  _  ..196 (.088)  .421 (.074)  .105  -. 112 (.157)  .008
133  .123 (.062)  -.963 (.121)  -.009  -.018 (.026)  .171
.227 (.017)  .201 (.005)  .407  .343 (.038)  .258
.239 (.023)  .311 (.008)  .491  .267 (.025)  .405
° 12 .012 (.011)  -.003 (.003)  -.169  -.072 (.017)  -.046
Log
Likelihood  -88.864  -463.064  -370.176  -61.751  -567.518
No.
Observations  173  1176  631  100  671
aFigures in parentheses are standard deviations.
bStandard deviations were not obtained for textiles and metal products due to irregularity of the estimated
Hessian.
13Table 3B: Constrained  Parameter  Estimates  by Sector"
Parameter  Meatpacking  Bakeries  Textilesb  Chemicalsc  Metal
Products'
.653  .267 (.090)  n.a.  1.28  .556
Ci2  -.184  .291 (.122)  n.a.  -1.00  -1.25
0%3  .531  .442 (.165)  n.a.  .727  1.70
1QI  -.014  -.056 (.010)  n.a.  -.070  -7.5e-4
OQ2  -.052  -.058 (.013)  n.a.  .121  .106
OQ3  .066  .114 (.017)  n.a.  -.051  -.105
-5.0e-6  -.329 (.069)  n.a.  -.062  .000
112  -3.9e-5  -.214 (.035)  n.a.  .062  .000
_  131  4.4e-5  .542 (.073)  n.a.  -1.9e-5  .000
022  -.422  -.207 (.044)  n.a.  -.062  .000
023  .422  .421 (.074)  n.a.  2.3e-5  .000
033  -.422  -.963 (121)  n.a.  -5.0e-6  .000
a °'  .255  .201 (.005)  n.a.  .348  .260
Cr2  .269  .311 (.008)  n.a.  .407  .406
a,2  -.013  -.003 (.003)  n.a.  -.083  -.047
Log
Likelihood  -93.849  -463.064  n.a.  -98.721  -568.935
No.
Observations  173  1176  631  100  671
2  Figures in parentheses  are standard  deviations.
b  Our solution  algorithm  failed to converge  for this sector.
Standard deviation  were not obtained for meatpacking,  chemicals, and metal products because
the coherency  constraint  was binding,  making the Hessian singular.
14Larger plants  appear  more likely  to use fuel oil, carbon,  and coke; but less likely  to use firewood.
For example, in metal products, a doubling  of plant size leads to about a ten percentage  point increase
in the share of these fuels.  This finding  has clear implications  concerning the incidence  of dirty fuel
taxes; it also implies  that virtually  all of the existing  econometric  literature  on energy substitution  is mis-
specified. As we will discuss  shortly, the implications  concerning  substitution  elasticities  are also non-
trivial.
C.  Implied Elasticities
At the Plant Level  Bccause  we allow for non-homothetic  technologies,  each plant has its own
matrix of price elasticities. To dramatize  this heterogeneity,  we construct  plant-specific  elasticities  using
predicted shares in equation  (6), which are evaluated  at the cross-plant  mean price vector, but at plant-
specific  output levels. Given energy  shares, partial  own  and cross-price  elasticities  of at a particular  plant
can be constructed  as: 7
o  if Si = (
(6-1)
[Sj3  +  S1(S, - 1)]/S,  otherwise
and
O  if Si = O
Xii 1.  -(6-2)
'  + S1Sj)/S, otherwise.
These elasticities  are partial because  they account only for substitution  between fuels, and do not reflect
any adjustments in overall energy usage by the plant.  Allen (1938) showed that the partial price
elasticities  are related to the partial elasticities  of substitution  (ojj)  as 71ij  = criS,. Hence, even though the
'  See, for example,  Griffin and Gregory (1976) and Pindyck (1979).
15Allen  partial cross elasticities  of substitution  are symmetric,  plant-level  partial  cross-price  elasticities  (and
sector elasticities)  will generally  not be.
Figures 1 through 9 are based on the parameter  estimates  in Table 3A.  They show how own-
and cross-price  elasticities  depend  upon plant size in the bakery industry, which we choose because it
seems to fit the model  best.  Each circle corresponds  to an actual  plant, so most plants lie in the ranges
of solid black along  the curve.  Notice  that the (partial)  elasticity of demand for electricity ranges from
around -1 for small plants  to -2 for moderately  sized  plants, implying  that  bigness  leads  to more flexibility
in electricity  use (figure 1). On the other hand, with the exception  of a handful  of outliers, ther is very
little variation in own-price  elasticity of demand for 'irewood (figure 2).  Moreover, small plants are
much more responsive  to changes in the price of other fuels than their larger counterparts  (figure 3).
Given these patterns it is unsurprising that cross-price partial elasticities  are also very size-
dependent. This is particularly  true for elasticities  that involve  energy sources  other than electricity  and
firewood.  Interestingly,  not only are cross-price elasticities  non-syrnmetric,  but the tend to change in
opposite  directions as plant size grows.  This is a consequence  of the structure  of equation  (6-2), which
has a negative  partial derivative  with respect to Si and a positive  partial derivative  with respect to Sj.
At the Sector Level:  The principal issue of policy interest is the sensitivity fuel demands to
changes  in relative  fuel  prices. We  construct  these  as consumption-weighted  averages  of the plant-specific
elasticity  expressions  above:
Eii =  E.m  7  i(ei  /Xi) and E 1j =  Em fj(  /Xi)
Here m indexes  the plant, ei is its consumption  of energy  source i, and Xi is industry-wide  consumpition
of energy source i.  Also, to obtain standard  errors for these expressions,  we begin by approximating  the
standard  errors of the plant-specific  elasticities  with:
16A  A  A
Var[U7i]  =  Var[, i ]/S2a.
For this expression  we have treated  predicted  cost shares SI as non-stochastic. We then aggregate  up to
standard  errors for the sectoral elasticities,  treating consumption  levels Xi'  as non-stochastic:
Var[E  J  =  (Em  Xim/S  m)2Var[,3  J, and
Var[E 1 ]  (E m xm/Sm)  Var[4, i]
A  A  A
where X tm =  x1
m/Xi.  Obviously our assumptions  about exogeneity  are not strictly justified, but they
should have only a minor effect on the estimated  variances.
17Table 4a: Partial Sectoral  Price Elasticities,  Meatpacking'
Elasticity of Demand for:
With  Electricity  Fuel wood  Other Fuels
Respect  to:
Pelectricity  .513 (.384)  -.335 (.324)  -.257 (.243)
-.498 (n.a.)  .444 (n.a.)  .371 (n.a.)
.161 (.302)  -.044 (.242)  .044 (.193)
-.498 (n.a.)  .444 (n.a.)  .371 (n a.)
Pfuel  wow  -.103 (.106)  -1.35 (.351)  .577  (.173)
.131 (n.a.)  -3.75 (n.a.)  1.12 (n.a.)
-.016 (.079)  -1.09 (.226)  .393 (.125)
.131 (n.a.)  -3.03 (n.a.)  .880 (n.a.)
P.d.r  -.318 (.292)  1.99 (.633)  -.170 (.122)
.445 (n.a.)  3.90 (n.a.)  -1.24 (n.a.)
-.059 (.231)  1.35 (.456)  -.233 (.101)
.445 (n.a.)  3.05 (n.a.)  -1.05 (n.a.)
The top figure in each cell is based on our nonhomothetic  model without  coherency  restrictions;
the second figure  is based on the same  model  with  coherency  restrictions;  the third figure is based
on our homothetic  model  without  coherency  restrictions;  and the last figure is based on the same
model with coherency  restrictions. Standard  deviations  are in parentheses  when available.
18Table 4b: Partial  Sectoral  Price Elasticities,  Bakeries'
l___________  Elasticity of Demand for:
With  Electricity  Fuel wood  Other  Fuels
Respect  to:
PelectIkity  -1.36 (.181)  -.401 (.125)  1.45 (.157)
-1.36 (.181)  -.401 (.125)  1.45 (.157)
-.715 (.131)  .890 (.157)  .153 (.050)
l__________  -.715 (.131)  .890 (.157)  .153 (.050)
rpf6m  .W  -.301 (.093)  -1.26 (.155)  1.29 (.157)
-.301 (.093)  -1.26 (.155)  1.29 (.157)
.661 (.117)  -1.80 (.316)  .723 (.166)
.661 (.117)  -1.80 (.316)  .723 (.166)
Pl.h.  1.82 (.193)  1.88 (.261)  -2.44  (.259)
1.82 (.193)  1.88 (.261)  -2.44 (.259)
.180 (.061)  1.04 (.275)  -.685 (.126)
.180 (.061)  1.04 (.275)  -.685 (.126)
See footnote to table 4a.
19Table 4c: Partial Sectoral Price Elasticities, Textilesa
Elasticity  of Demand  for:
With  Electricity  Coal,  Other Fuels
Respect to:  Carbon,
____________  Coke
|  Pelecticiry  0.967 (n.a.)  -3.10 (n.a.)  .206 (n.a.)
n.a. (n.a.)  n.a. (n.a.)  n.a. (n.a.)
5.20 (1.04)  -11.9 (2.77)  -.941 (.490)
n.a. (n.a.)  n.a. (n.a.)  n.a. (n.a.)
|  pcm  etc.  -1.13 (n.a.)  2.30 (n.a.)  .321 (n.a.)
n.a. (n.a.)  n.a. (n.a.)  n.a. (n.a.)
4.33  (.956)  13.6 (3.33)  -.640 (.574)
n.a. (n.a.)  n.a. (n.a.)  n.a. (n.a.)
|  POttef  ~~.217  (n.a.)  1.06 (n.  a.)  -.445 (n.a.)
n.a. (n.a.)  n.a. (n.a.)  n.a. (n.a.)
-1.02 (.511)  -2.21 (1.73)  1.53 (.263)
n.a. (n.a.)  n.a. (n.a.)  n.a. (n.a.)
See footnote to table 4a.
20Table 4d: Partial Sectoral Price Elasticities, Chemicalsa
|_________ Elasticity  of Demand  for:
With  Electricity  Fuel Oil,  Other Fuels
Respect to:  Diesel
PelerLricity  -.884 (.823)  .618 (.364)  1.33 (1.38)
-.423 (n.a.)  .407 (n.a.)  .337 (n.a.)
1.02 (.693)  -.779 (.412)  -.969 (.763)
n.a. (n.a.)  n.a. (n.a.)  n.a. (n.a.)
Pfel  od  etc,  .593  (.452)  -.273 (.107)  -.445 (1.19)
.384 (n.a.)  -.300 (n.a.)  .459 (n.a.)
-.787 (.511)  .249 (.261)  2.11 (.922)
n.a.(n.a.)  n.a. (n.a.)  n.a. (n.a.)
Pother  .371 (.371)  -.145 (.258)  -.883 (.197)
.092 (n.a.)  .100 (n.a.)  -.748 (n.a.)
-.276 (.205)  .546 (.200)  -.999 (.195)
n.a. (n.a.)  n.a. (n.a.)  n.a. (n.a.)
See footnote  to table 4a.
21Table 4e: Partial Sectoral Price Elasticities, Metal Products'
Elasticity  of Demand  for:
With  Electricity  Fuel Oil,  Other Fuels
Respect to:  Diesel
PelecLricty  -.004 (n.a.)  .302 (n.a.)  -.172 (n.a.)
-.401 (n.a.)  .310 (n.a.)  .373 (n.a.)
n.a. (n.a.)  n.a. (n.a.)  n.a. (n.a.)
n.a. (n.a.)  n.a. (n.a.)  n.a. (n.a.)
fel  oil etc.  .254 (n.a.)  -.465 (n.a.)  .213 (na.)
.262 (n.a.)  -.451 (n.a.)  .184 (n.a.)
n.a. (n.a.)  n.a. (n.a.)  n.a. (n.a.)
n.a. (n.a.)  n.a. (n.a.)  n.a. (n.a.)
P.Ox  -.134 (n.a.)  .169 (n.a.)  .043 (n.a.)
.288 (n.a.)  .146 (n.a.)  -.479 (n.a.)
n.a. (n.a.)  n.a. (n.a.)  n.a. (n.a.)
n.a. (n.a.)  n.a. (n.a.)  n.a. (n.a.)
a  See footnote  to table 4a.
22Table 4 presents our estimates  of partial price elasticity  of demand  at the sector level along with
their standard  errors.  The top figure  in each cell is based  on our nonhomothetic  model  without  coherency
restrictions  (Table 3A); the second figure is based on the same model with coherency  restrictions  (Table
3B); the third figure is based on our homothetic model without coherency restrictions (unreported
parameter estimates); and the last figure is based on the same model with coherency restrict'ias
(unreported  parameter  estimates).  As already discussed,  the framework  we are using does not seem to
fit the data for textiles  and chemicals  well, so we confine our attention  to the remaining  three sectors.
The most noteworthy  feature of these  results is that elasticities  differ  substantially  across sectors.
It appears that bakeries  are very responsive  to changes  in the relative  prices  of alternative  fuels, especially
carbon-based  energy  sources. In contrast,  energy  demand  appears  to be very insensitive  to relative  prices
among metal products plants, regardless  of what set of estimates  are used.  Finally, rneatpackers  fall
somewhere  in between, with little price responsiveness  in electricity  demand,  but more for other energy
sources, especially  if coherency-constrained  figures are used. Therefore, it appears  that the incidence  of
carbon  taxes would  depend  in significant  measure  on the industrial  sector, with metal  products  plants least
able to adjust. Of course, more information  on market structure and demand in these sectors would be
needed  before a full analysis  of incidence  could  be accomplished.
In their closely related  work, Lee and Pitt found elasticities  that tended  to be larger than the ones
we report here.  There are a number  of possible explanations. One is that by imposing  homotheticity,
they  forced cross-plant  variation  in technologies  to show up as price-induced  substitution  since fuel prices
vary across the plant size spectrum  (MWss  and Tybout, 1992). Support  for this explana.ion  is provided
by  contrasts between oui  elasticity estimates with and without homotheticity  imposed.  Another
possibility  is that physical  quantities  or expenditures  are measured  with  error, so that when  physical  prices
are imputed, they are contaminated  by spurious  negative  correlation  with quantities  (e.g., Deaton, 1987).
Our approach should not be subject to this bias because  we have instrumented  noise out of prices.
23It is difficult  to compare our results  with those in most other  studies  because  we are working  with
data from a semi-industrialized  country, and estimating  industry-specific  parameters. However, several
observations  are worth making. First, sectoral-level  studies tend to find partial own-price  elasticities  of
demand that are similar in magnitude  to ours, and lower than Lee and Pitt's.  Second, like us, studies
based on aggregated  data tend to find that the own-price  elasticity  of demand  for electricity  is lower than
elasticities  for other energy sources (e.g., Fuss (1977)  and Pindyck (1979)).
V.  Conduding Remarks
Overall, our estimates suggest that there is substantial  scope for carbon taxes to induce fuel
substitution,  but that the response  will be very uneven, not only across sectors, but across producers  of
different sizes.  Therefore, although Eskeland  and Jimenez (1990) may be correct in arguing that fiscal
incentives  are less susceptible  to manipulation  by special interest groups than direct emission  controls,
the costs of adjustment  are likely to be concentrated  fairly narrowly  for some fuels.
Unfortunately,  the evidence  on elasticities  we report is not sufficient  to assess the distribution  of
adjustment  burdens.  It is limited to several sectors, and it must be combined with information  on the
shares of energy spending  in total costs, and on product  market demand  elasticities. However, combined
with descriptive statistics on energy use patterns in all manufacturing  sectors (see Moss and Tybout,
1992),  our figures should provide  the basis for an assessment  of all but the latter.
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25Appendix
In this appendix  we summarize  the likelihood  function  that Lee and Pitt (1987) developed. For
our purposes  it is sufficient  to consider  three types of regimes: all three fuels are used, two of the three
fuels are used, and only one of the three fuels are used.  As in the text, let asterisks denote observed  (as
opposed to notional) shares, so that the first type of regime occurs whe.. all elements  of S = (Sl,  S;,
S3  )are strictly positive. Under these conditions  notional and observed  shares coincide,  thus in terms of
exogenous  variables and disturbances,  equation  (3) implies  that the first regime is observed when:
61  +  ,B,'lnP  + el > 0,  (Al-1)
62 +  #2lnP +  E 2 >  0,  (A  1-2)
61 + 62  +  (1  +  i 2 )1'nP  +  El  +  e 2 <  1.  (A1-3)
Here Ai =  (iij,2,00),  InP = (InP,lnP2,1nP 3)', and 6i =  cx,  +  OQilnQ.  Given that one of the three
disturbances  is redundant  by equation  (4), the conditional  likelihood  function  for observations  from this
regime is:
f(Si - 61 - ,B,lnP, S; - 62 - 2 InP),
where f(*)  is the bivariate normal density  function  for (e 1,e2).
An example  of the second type of regime  occurs when S  = (0, S;, S3),  where S; > 0 and S; >
0.  Here the logarithmic  viitual price for input I at S  is obtained  by setting S, = 61  + 0,/ 1'nP  + e1 =
0:
Int, = -(63  +  ,3 2lnP 2 +  0,31nP 3 + e3)/, 1. (A2)
26Substituting  Int1 for InP, in equation  5, the observed  cost share for the second energy  subgroup  satisfies.
S:  =  62 +  2 2 llnP  +  E 2 +  O3,(lnt, - lnP,)
=  62  +  12 InP  +  E 2 - (321/111)(61  +  01 InP  +  e).  (A3)
Hence the regime conditions  i  ￿  P, and 0 <  S; <  1 can be expressed  in terms of exogenous  variables
and disturbances  as:
(l/,~)(6,  + 13 1InP + e,) 2  0,  (A4-  1)
1 >  62  +  0 2InP +  e2 - (021/22)(61  +  13InP +  el) >  0.  (A4-2)
If  1,,  <  0, the set of (el,e 2) values that satisfy these  conditions  will not overlap  with the (e1,e 2) values in
conditions  (Al).  This "coherency"  requirement  ensures, from (A4-1), that
e1 <  -(6w  +  1  InP),
and the conditional  likelihood  function, given  S'  = (O,S:,S;),  becomes
+1  + I1nP)  f(el,Z 2(S;,ej))  dE,,
-oo
where  2(S241)  =  S-  - 62  - 02'lnP  +  (021/311)(61  +  1  InP +  e,), a rearrangement  of (A3).
An example  of the third type of regime  occurs when S  = (0,0,1), that is, inputs I and 2 are not
consumed.  By setting S, = 0 and S2 = 0, the virtual prices for input 1 and 2 can be expressed  as
27ln  [InPi  5  /3I13 2 5-1  61 +  10lnP +  (AS)
l  t2  I  1nP2 L3 2 1 2 2 62  +  3 2 lnP  +  E 2
The regime conditions  are  ,  S  PI and t2  c  P2, or using  (A5):
(1/(0131122  13l2))[,B22(0I  +  0,  InP  +  el)  -
012(02  +  02'nP  +  E,)]  2  0,  (A6-1)
(1011322  - 132))[-021((1  +  1I1nP +  el)
01102  +  012lnP  +  e2)]  >  O  (A6-2)
The (el,e 2) values that satisfy  conditions  (A6) will not overlap with those in (Al) or (A3) only if 01,022  -
21,2  >  0. Using this coherency  requirement,  (A6) becomes
ti  - (0 12/022)E2  C  ((12/022)(62  +  02 InP)  - (61  +  (1  lnP),
-(3 12/31 O)E 1 +  E2 C  (121/111)(61  +  10 InP) - (62  +  12  InP),
and the conditional  likelihood  function, given S' = (0,0,1), can be written  as
J  (1312/1322(62  + 12"  lnP) - (56  +13'nP)  I (012I/)(6b+O,1lnP)  - (62+12lnP)  g(e,,eDde,de;,
where g is the bivariate  normal density  function  of e  and e2, with
C- =  e, - (012/922)e 2 and eL  =  -(012/3 11)e1 +  e 2.
The likelihood  functions  for the other regimes  can similarly  be derived. The coherency  requirements  022
28<  0,  033  <  0,  011033  1  t3  >  0, and  033 _ t23 >  0 are also needed to ensure that the seven regimes
not overlap one another, that is, that the regime  probabilities  sum to one.
29Elastici-ty  and  Output,  Industry  5117
0  l
00  OD  oO0
10
C14
I)  _ Q)  -
°  (NJ  Q









0~~~~~~~~~~~ (0  2
1  6  8  10  12  14  16
InQElastici-ty  and  Output,  Industry  31 1





8  10  12  14  16













7  89  1  0  1  1  1  2  1  3  1  4  1  5






41  V)0  0
(NJ-~~~~~~~~~~~~I  00 
7 5  9  ~~1  0  1  1  1  2  1  3  1  4  1  5













°  '  ''  '  '_  ~~  ~~~~~~~12  n 






00  OD0 
0  I  p  I  pIII
7  891  0  1  1  1  2  1  3  1  4  1  5
InQElasticity  and  Output,  Industry  31 1  7
0  ,





16  1  l  l2  1  4  16







1 6  8  10  12  14  16
InQPolicy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for  paper
WPS1278  Regulation and Commitment in the  Ahmed Galal  March 1994  B. Moore
Development of Telecommunications  38526
in Chile
WPS1279  Optimal Hedging Strategy Revisited:  Ying Qian  March 1994  S. Lipscomb
Acknowledging the  Existence of  Ronald Duncan  33718
Nonstationary Economic Time Series
WPS1280  The Economic Impact of Export  Wendy E. Takacs  March 1994  M. Patena
Controls: An Application to Mongolian  37947
Cashmere and Romanian Wood Products
WPS1281  Human and Physical Infrastructure:  Emmanuel Jimenez  April 1994  L. Longo
Public Investment and Pricing Policies  37786
in Developing Countries
WPS1282  Copper and the Negative Price of  Donald Frederick Larson  April 1994  A. Kim
Storage  33715
WPS1283  Interest Rates irn  Open Economies:  Dipak Das Gupta  April 1994  B. Kim
Real Interest Rate Parity, Exchange  Bejoy Das Gupta  82467
Rates, and Country Risk in Industrial
and Developing Countries
WPS1284  The Soviet Economic Decline:  William Easterly  April 1994  R. Martin
Historical and Republican Data  Stanley Fischer  31320
WPS1285  Capital Fundamentalism, Economic  Robert G. King  April 1994  P. Sintim-Aboagye
Development, and Economic Growth  Ross Levine  38526
WPS1286  Economic Transformation and the  Luca Barbone  April 1994  S. Harbi
Fiscal Crisis: A Critical Look at the  Domenico jr. Marchetti  37143
Central European Experience of the 1990s
WPS1287  Unstable Inflation and Seignorage  Jacques  Morisset  April 1994  D. Jenkins
Revenues in Latin America: How Many  37890
Times Can the Government Fool People?
WPS1288  The Public Finance of Infrastructure:  Vinaya Swaroop  April 1994  C. Jones
Issues and Options  37699
WPS1289  A Fiscal Needs Approach to Equali-  Anwar Shah  April 1994  C. Jones
zation Transfers in a Decentralized Federation  37754
WPS1290  Oil Price Instability, Hedging, and an  Stijn Claessens  Apnl 1994  D. Gustafson
Oil Stabilization Fund: The Case of  Panos Varangis  33714
Venezuela
WPS1291 A Survey of Viet Nam's Legal  Natalie G. Lichtenstein  April 1994  M. Rangarajan
Framework in Transition  81710Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for  paper
WPS1292  Services as a Major Source of Growth William Easterly  April 1994  C. Rollison
in Russia and Other Former Soviet  Martha de Melo  84768
States  Gur Ofer
WPS1293  Product Standards,  Imperfect  Glenn Harrison  April 1994  N. Artis
Competition, and Completion of the  Thomas Rutherford  38010
Market in the European Union  David Tarr
WPS1294  Regulations, Institutions, and  Hadi Salehi Esfahani  April 1994  B. Moore
Economic Performance: The Political  35261
Economy of the Philippines'
Telecommunications  Sector
WPS1295  Why Higher Fiscal Spending Persists  Bruno Boccara  April 1994  M. Pfeiffenberger
When a Boom in Primary Commodities Ends  34963
WPS1296  Earnings-Related Mandatory  Salvador Valdes-Prieto  April 1994  H. Rizkalla
Pensions: Concepts for Design  84766
WPS1297  How Relative Prices Affect Fuel  Charles C. Guo  May 1994  C. Jones
Use Patterns in Manufacturing:  James R. Tybout  37699
Plant-Level Evidence from Chile